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14. ABSTRACT
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Abstract

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1. Introduction

The Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) conducts civil military operations throughout the Afghanistan Combined Joint Operational Area (CJOA). The CJCMOTF enables security, facilitates reconstruction, and promotes good governance in the areas it operates. Additionally, it facilitates communications between the Afghan central government and provincial, district, and local leaders. These efforts help legitimize the nascent Afghan government in the eyes of the Afghan people and reduce causes of instability.

The primary instruments through which CJCMOTF operates are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The PRT concept was developed in concert with the Afghan government and has its full support. The first PRT was established under United States (US) command in Gardez in December 2002 to serve the eastern United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) region. Today there are also Coalition and NATO PRTs in Bamian (New Zealand), Mazar-e-Sharif (United Kingdom), Konduz (Germany), Parwan (US), Kandahar (US), Herat (US), and Jalalabad (US). Four additional PRTs are expected to open by February 2004 in Ghazni, Asadabad, Khowst, and Qalat, with a total of 16 PRTs expected to be operational by the summer of 2004. The PRTs are essential to strengthening the reach of the Afghan government and improving the ability of the government to effectively govern.

We identified the need to develop a system of metrics to assess progress in achieving desired tactical and operational effects toward a defined civil-military operations (CMO) end state. Therefore, we initiated a program to develop CMO measures of effectiveness (MOE) for Afghanistan in July, 2003. This report documents the process followed and the system developed. Lessons-learned are incorporated.

2. Development of Measures of Effectiveness

2.1. General

The program to establish MOE for the CJCMOTF CMO in Afghanistan was initiated to systematically assess progress in achieving effects toward a defined end state. Although the specific application was development of MOE for CMO, *the process described below can be applied to any type of operation.* Measures of effectiveness are an essential component of effects-based operations, enabling the commander to assess effects as part of his decision cycle. According to the effects-based operations concept, the steps in the commander's battle space system, or decision cycle, include assess, plan, execute, adapt, and assess, (US Joint Forces Command, 2003). Although the effects-based operations approach is new, the concept of assessing effects as an integral part of the commander's decision cycle is not. According to Army doctrine, assessing is an indispensable step in the commander's decision cycle (US Department of the Army, 2001). Joint doctrine for CMO specifically addresses the use of MOE as a means of gathering information for input into the commander's decision cycle (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001).

Assessment requires a systematic method for monitoring progress toward attaining the desired end state. Often, easily quantifiable metrics are selected for use in the assessment phase. These frequently include meetings completed; projects completed; dollars spent; schools, wells, and clinics constructed; and others. Each of these represents a measure of how many of a given type of task is completed, such that, for example, a project completed is a task completed. These may be termed measures of performance (MOP). Metrics such as MOP are readily quantifiable and provide useful information. However, monitoring the number of tasks performed does not necessarily provide reliable information about progress toward an end state. To reliably monitor progress toward a defined end state, MOE must be used.

Measures of effectiveness may be contrasted with MOP, which are much more widely known and easier to identify. Measures of performance allow quantification of the number of tasks completed. They may also provide information on how efficiently tasks are performed, for example, average time to award contracts or the number of projects completed on time may be monitored. The important point is that, in general, tasks are assigned to achieve effects. Effects are desired to reach conditions that characterize a defined end state. Theoretically, tasks could be very well executed but not produce the desired effects or provide any progress toward the desired end state. This situation would be very difficult to identify by monitoring only MOP. By monitoring MOE, specific information is obtained on whether and to what degree desired effects are obtained by performance of assigned tasks. According to Joint Doctrine (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001), MOE: 1) assist the commander in determining when all or part of the mission has been accomplished; 2) provide a means to evaluate the contributions of military efforts to the larger desired end state; and 3) provide a baseline of indicators. From a broader perspective, MOE provide information on progress toward the defined end state, enabling the most informed decisions possible.

2.2. Characteristics of Measures of Effectiveness

It is useful to consider the important characteristics of effective MOE. In general, MOE should (be):

1. Appropriate: provide information useful to the commander and staff or other audience.

2. Mission-related: provide meaningful assessment of progress toward the end state.

3. Measurable: quantitative is preferred.

4. Reasonable in number: too many becomes unmanageable.

5. Timely: timely detection of effects allows timely input for the commander to respond.

6. Reliable: two measures of same item at same time give same result.

7. Specific: measures indicator of interest with minimal interference from other factors.

8. Sensitive: can detect important changes.

9. Feasible: do-able by the proposed personnel.

10. Measured using a standardized collection tool or method.

11. Provide information useful at multiple levels of command.

2.3. Approach to the Development of Measures of Effectiveness

To most effectively develop MOE, a systematic and prospective approach must be used. It is possible, and perhaps sometimes necessary, to select MOE as tasks are defined during the course of a long term operation. However, this reactive method of MOE identification has at least three important drawbacks. The first is that this approach risks the development of multiple MOE that are tied only to specific tasks and become obsolete when the task is complete, and may not contribute to a focused and manageable approach to MOE. The second is that it may be impossible to clearly see how the effects attained fit into, and define progress toward, the overall end state and any related interim states along the pathway to the final end state. Third, this approach deprives staffs of visibility on the overall array of potential MOE that may be employed throughout a series of related operations.

The following steps should be taken in developing MOE. In practice it may be necessary to use an abbreviated approach due to time constraints, similar to the approach to abbreviation of the standard military decision making process. Omission of any step should be based on a conscious decision, with the implications of omission understood in advance. There are two major components to this process, 1) End state definition and identification of potential effects and 2) MOE selection and refinement.

2.4. End state Definition and Identification of Potential Effects

1. Characterize/define the desired end state. The end state should be viewed as being made up of a set of conditions that must be present when all operations are complete.

2. Determine what set of (potential) effects results in the end state. Effects are closely related to conditions, and may be thought of as the changes that must take place so that the desired set of conditions exists. Multiple effects are often required to move the system (enemy, populace, etc.) from the present or initial state (initial set of conditions) to the desired end state.

3. Determine whether a relevant threshold can be defined for each effect that identifies when that effect has been achieved to the desired level. Thresholds are not necessary to develop a MOE program but are useful when possible to define.

4. Identify pathways to arrive at the desired end state. For example, a three phase operation will have a pathway involving execution of the three successive phases. Another way to look at this is to develop courses of action.

5. Identify interim states along each pathway, or the selected pathway (course of action). Interim states may be thought of as the "end states" after each successive operation or phase in a series that leads along a pathway to the "final" desired end state. For the example of a three phased operation above, the end states after each of phases one and two would be "interim" states. The "final" end state would exist after phase three. Interim states are not required but are very important to identify when possible.

6. Determine what set of (potential) effects results in each interim state.

2.5. Measure of Effectiveness Selection and Refinement

For each effect in the sets of effects for the interim states and final end state:

1. Determine the pattern of change associated with progress toward each interim state (if any) and end state for each identified effect.

2. Identify potential indicators of progress for each effect.

3. Identify common indicators that may cross over effects.

4. Identify sentinel indicators (e.g. if one indicator is always indicative of some other indicators, it could be a sentinel indicator for the others).

5. Make a preliminary selection of candidate indicators to become MOE.

6. Assess each potential MOE based on the desired generic MOE characteristics, as described above.

7. Select the initial set of MOE.

8. Conduct pilot tests of initial MOE to determine feasibility and utility.

9. Based on results of pilot testing, select final set of MOE.

10. Remember that MOE may change as situation, available information, mission, etc. change.

2.6. Measures of Effectiveness as Part of a System

A complete set of MOE will provide a comprehensive means of assessing progress toward all or nearly all of the conditions that make up the desired end state. The set of MOE should be incorporated into a system designed to monitor MOE. Measures of effectiveness are useful in and of themselves in assessing effects for discrete operations of limited scope. They may be used individually in a limited way but will be most effective when incorporated into a comprehensive system.

Several points should be considered in developing a MOE system. The system includes: 1) measurement, which includes the measurement method or tool and the people performing the measurement, and which produces data; 2) data communication, which includes communication of data obtained during measurement to a central data collection point; 3) data entry and storage, which includes entry of data into a data set or data base; 4) data handling and analysis; and 5) results interpretation and reporting. The measurement component is addressed in the ideal characteristics of MOE above. The data communication component may be different for different MOE within the system. The key is that all necessary communications pathways must be clearly defined. Methods to communicate data should include measures to protect against transcription errors, data corruption, and data loss, and should minimize required effort. Data entry is a point where transcription error may be common. Either a data set or a data base format may be used for data storage, based on the needs of the system, available expertise, and preference. The results and interpretation component should be given significant thought. This is a point where specific expertise is necessary. Most if not all of the data collected as MOE will require statistical analysis. Statistical analysis is the only means that allows determination of a change (effect) with a specified degree of confidence that the change is real, and not just due to random chance. In some cases, apparent effects may be so numerically large that they appear to obviously represent true changes. However, even apparently large effects may actually be due to random chance. There is no substitute for proper statistical analysis. That having been said, data analysis for MOE can be accomplished using simple statistics. More sophisticated analyses may be necessary and desirable. Consider using reach-back capability (specialized capability attained through cooperation with agencies located in the United States or elsewhere outside of theater) for these analyses if the proper statistical expertise is not present or available within the unit or with an interagency partner in theater.

Before developing a system, it is important to conduct a pilot(s) using MOE, including data handling and analysis. This will allow early elimination of unsuitable MOE and will give a realistic preview of the levels of effort, automation, communications, and technical expertise that will be necessary. Understand that the system will evolve as improvements become apparent or mission requirements change. It is important to note that, while mission requirements or the general approach to operations (e.g. lines of operation) may change, the desired end state is not likely to change much if at all during a campaign. Because the MOE and the system as a whole are based on the end state, as opposed to a given approach (e.g. lines of operation), the system will be able to adapt to changes with minimal impact. The required MOE should drive the design of the system. Developing a system for another purpose and then selecting only MOE that are compatible with the existing software system severely limits flexibility in MOE selection and should be avoided. Once a flexible MOE system that uses commonly available software is developed, it can be adapted to future MOE. Flexibility is important. Specifically designed software systems are not necessary and are likely to be difficult to use and adapt.

Properly designed and implemented MOE provide critical information on whether and to what degree operations have the intended effects. Assessment of effects is an

integral part of the commander's decision cycle, regardless of the operational paradigm employed. When considered along with other sources of information, such as intelligence and information from the other battlefield operating systems, MOE enables the most effective decision making. A distinction has been made between MOE and MOP, with the importance of MOE emphasized. In most cases, commanders will want some information on MOP as well as MOE. Measures of performance can be very useful, as long as the distinction between MOE and MOP is clear and confusion between the two avoided. Measures of effectiveness are used to determine whether or not the tasks performed were *effective*. The bottom line is that the MOE system must yield information that is useful for the commander in decision making, when considered in light of all other available information.

3. Civil Military Operations End State Definition

3.1. Previously Defined End States

The descriptions of end states presented here are based on information that was current at the time that the CMO end state definition process was executed. It is understood that this information is subject to change.

Key documents describe the Afghan end state from different perspectives. Each perspective is important to consider in developing the CMO end state for Afghanistan. Foremost is the Afghan end state set forth in President Karzai's National Program for Reconstruction (ITSA, 2002). The Government of Afghanistan's (GoA) vision for the ultimate Afghan end state is for a "prosperous, secure Afghanistan; a nation built on a credible State with a transparent and accountable administration, a well-developed civil society with democratic institutions supported and being supported by the rule of law. In this environment an effective and competitive private sector will flourish allowing the people of Afghanistan to realize the potential of their own natural and human resources." The National Development Framework for Afghanistan was devised as a road map to reach this end state. The National Development Framework involves 12 national programs: 1) Refugee Return; 2) Education; 3) Health and Nutrition; 4) Livelihoods; 5) Culture; 6) Transport; 7) Urban Management; 8) Energy, Mining and Telecommunications; 9) Natural Resource Management; 10) Trade and Private Investment; 11) Public Administration; and 12) Security and Rule of Law. It is clear that reaching this ultimate Afghan end state will be a long process involving many organizations, each with one or more roles to play.

3.1.1. The document commonly referred to as the Bonn Agreement (UNDP, 2002) sets forth the schedule, steps to be taken, and the United Nations' Role in establishing a democratic government in Afghanistan. Major milestones in this process include establishment of the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA), the drafting of a new constitution by the Constitutional Loya Jirga, and national elections. The Bonn Agreement is a principal guiding document for all involved in reconstruction and security efforts in Afghanistan, particularly our multilateral partners, the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

3.1.2. The United States Department of State (DoS) has described a shorter term perspective of the Afghan end state (US DoS, 2002). The DoS desired end state for Afghanistan after two years is described in terms of Political, Security, Economic, and Humanitarian conditions.

3.1.2.1. Political conditions at the end of two years include:

1. Successful conclusion to the Bonn process.

2. A new constitution in place ratified by the Constitutional Loya Jirga.

3. A balance of regional autonomy and central authority mindful of Afghanistan's history.

4. A broad-based central authority having started to provide basic social services to its 25 million people.

5. Political decision-making on the basis of representative majority rule and consensus as opposed to warlordism and force of arms.

3.1.2.2. In terms of security, DoS end state conditions include:

1. Afghanistan no longer a safe harbor for terrorists or their financial and material resources.

2. Sufficient internal stability for delivery of aid and development assistance.

3. "Spoilers" neutralized or marginalized ("Spoilers" are individuals and/or entities working against the legitimizing of the Afghan Government).

4. National Military and Police assuming responsibility for internal security, with representation from major ethnic and regional groups and modern command structures; respectful of human rights. Continued need for external monitoring.

5. Relative peace and cooperation among the country's regions and with its neighbors.

3.1.2.3. Economic conditions include:

1. Economy re-emerging through agricultural development, restored infrastructure, increased international trade and small-scale industry.

2. Economic structures which respect Islamic Law and permit normal international economic interaction and development.

3. Schools, including vocational schools, raising the quality of the workforce.

4. Viable alternatives emerging to banditry and narco-trafficking.

5. Re-engagement in regional economic and trading relationships.

3.1.2.4. Humanitarian conditions include:

1. Moving towards agricultural self-sufficiency.

2. Reconstruction and development efforts well underway.

3. Refugees returning home.

4. Dispute resolution mechanisms in place.

5. De-mining operations well underway.

3.1.3. According to the US Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff, the desired end state is a GoA that is:

1. Moderate and democratic, though understanding that Afghans will not copy US-style institutions.

2. Representative of all responsible elements in Afghanistan and formed through the political participation of the Afghan people.

3. Capable of effectively controlling and governing its territory.

4. Capable of implementing policies to stimulate economic development.

5. Willing to contribute to a continuing partnership with the US-led coalition in the Global War on Terror.

3.1.4. The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)/Combined Forces Command-Central Asia (CFC-CA) end state includes the following:

1. The GOA, unilaterally or with the assistance of an established international security force, capable of preventing the re-emergence of terrorism in Afghanistan.

2. Classified.

3. Classified.

4. Classified.

5. Classified.

6. Classified.

3.1.5. The end state set forth by Combined Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180) is: GoA committed to and capable of preventing the re-emergence of terrorism on Afghan soil.

3.2. Civil-Military Operations End State Development

These end states are compatible in that each end state can be viewed as an interim state along the pathway to the ultimate Afghan end state, as set forth by the GoA. If one considers the pathway to the ultimate Afghan end state as a timeline beginning with the time of Taliban rule and ending with the ultimate Afghan end state, the pathway progresses through intermediate, or interim, states (Figure 1). In general, each of the

many organizations involved in the process of rebuilding Afghanistan has a discrete role to play, with a corresponding segment of the timeline. Segments of various organizations may overlap and individual organizations may have multiple roles with multiple corresponding segments of the timeline. Each of the end states listed above has a place along this timeline. Selected key milestones or end states are listed along the timeline in Figure 1 for illustration.

Although end states for Afghanistan were previously identified by the US DoS, US CJCS, USCENTCOM, and CJTF-180, as well the GoA, CJCMOTF required a greater degree of end state definition to enable the development of a reliable set of MOEs. The first step was to define the civil military end state as the set of conditions and capabilities of the Afghan government that must exist such that 1) the major coalition military presence can depart Afghanistan and 2) the Afghan government will continue to progress with only the assistance of nongovernmental organizations (NGO), civilian coalition government representatives, and continued international fiscal and material aid. It was further recognized that this CMO end state was in effect an interim state on the pathway to the ultimate Afghan end state as described by the GoA (Figure 1).

As part of determining the set of conditions and capabilities that comprise the CMO end state, a one-day workshop was conducted in Kabul. Attendees included: selected personnel from CJCMOTF, CJTF-180, the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A), US DoS, and UNAMA. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) was invited but could not attend and provided input separately. Participants were asked to 1) define the essential Afghan government functions that must exist to reach the CMO end state and 2) rank the importance of each Afghan ministry relative to the end state. Summarized results are shown in tables 1 and 2.

Based on results of the workshop and the products of prior mission analysis, a working group further refined the CMO end state definition, which may be summarized as: *A Legitimate Afghan Government that demonstrates 1) Competency; 2) Influence; 3) Democracy that is Sustainable, Participatory, and Rights-respecting, and 4) Core Deliverables in the Areas of Security, Justice, Education, and Mechanisms for Economic Development.* Taken together, the first three comprise the fundamentals of good governance, which are important for all functions of government. The fourth identifies government functions that must be established to varying degrees to achieve the CMO end state. Further definition of the end state was made in terms of capabilities that the GoA must possess, and functions that it must perform to achieve the end state. Table 3 lists the end state characteristics, as listed in the summarized end state, along with corresponding minimum essential core functions, and critical primary functions.

Figure 1. Pathway to Afghan End State

Table 1. Essential Functions of the Afghan State Required to Attain the CMO End State

Security (Internal and External)
Rule of Law (Including Judicial and Enforcement)
Economic Development
Education
Fiscal and Monetary
Communications
Govern/Lead

Table 2. Afghan Ministries that are Essential in Terms of Attaining the CMO End State

Defense
Office of the President
Interior (with essential Frontiers function)
Finance
Justice
Education
Health
Agriculture
Communication
Commerce
Foreign Affairs
Water and Power
Public Works
Rural Rehabilitation and Development
Civil Aviation and Tourism

Table 3. Civil Military End State Government Characteristics and Functions

End State Characteristics	Minimum Essential Core Functions	Critical Primary Functions
Competency	Conduct Government Business Effectively, Efficiently, Responsively, and in an Accountable Manner	Communicate
		Coordinate Aid Efforts
		Establish and Enforce Quality Standards for Government Goods and Services (Including Aid Projects)
		Establish Bureaucracy
		Be Responsive to the Needs of the People
		Conduct Strategic Planning
		Respect Human Rights
		Inform the Public of Government Activities
		Conduct Personnel Management
		Provide Physical Infrastructure for Government Function
		Cooperate with Other Parts of Government
		Disseminate Information
		Plan and Execute Budgets
		Disburse Funds
Influence	Generate Support of the Populace for GoA and Key Institutions	Generate Support of Population for ITGA
		Generate Support of Population for the Afghan National Army (ANA)
		Generate Support of Population for the Police

Table 3. Civil Military End State Government Characteristics and Functions (continued)

End State Characteristics	Minimum Essential Core Functions	Critical Primary Functions
Democracy	Execute Democratic Processes that are Participatory, Consensus Oriented, Equitable, Inclusive, and Sustainable	Ratify the Constitution
		Conduct National Elections that have National and International Legitimacy
Core Deliverables	Provide Security	Establish National Security Apparatus
		Fully establish/reform the Ministry of Defense
		Train and Staff ANA at Target Levels
		Establish National Police
		Establish Regional Police
		Staff Local and Regional Police at Proper Levels (Based on Population by District)
		Establish Functional, Properly Equipped, and Properly Staffed Police Stations in each District
		Establish and Staff Highway Patrol
		Control Borders
		Complete the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process
		Provide Security
		Provide Intelligence (Internal and External)
		Conduct International Diplomacy
	Provide Justice	Establish National Justice System and Procedures
		Establish a Functioning Federal Court System
		Provide Functioning Jails that Meet International Minimum Standards in Each Province

Table 3. Civil Military End State Government Characteristics and Functions (continued)

End State Characteristics	Minimum Essential Core Functions	Critical Primary Functions
Core Deliverables (continued)	Make Quality Education Available to Citizens	Establish National System and Standards for Education
		Make Elementary Education Available and Compulsory for Children in All Districts
		Establish Plans for Making Secondary Education Widely Available
		Make Literacy Training Available for Adults in all Districts
	Establish Basic Mechanisms for Economic Development	Collect Revenue Effectively and Systematically
		Establish a Sustainable Agricultural Development Program to Develop Agricultural Exports and Agricultural Self-sufficiency
		Build Road Infrastructure to Connect Major Cities and Plan Road Construction to Connect Agricultural Producers to Markets
		Establish Policies to Promote Economic Development

4. Overall Measures of Effectiveness System

4.1. General

Three major components were identified for inclusion in the overall MOE system to address all important functions identified in the CMO end state: 1) assessment of governance quality indicators (AGQI); 2) assessment of governance mechanisms (AGM); and 3) national key program indicators.

4.2. Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators

The AGQI is an assessment of the quality of governance from the point of view of consumers of government. It takes the form of an interview and is primarily conducted at the level of average citizens, business people, and low-level government and traditional leaders. However, the AGQI may be used with any category of person. The data produced are of significant use in the assessment phase of the commander's decision cycle at the PRT level, and also when consolidated at higher levels. Additionally, the data are useful for multilateral decision makers. The AGQI is discussed in detail in another section of this report.

4.3. Assessment of Governance Mechanisms

The AGM is an assessment performed at the city/district to ministerial levels of government to examine the mechanisms employed by government in the following categories: 1) Communications; 2) Aid Coordination; 3) Standards; 4) Bureaucracy; 5) Responsiveness to Needs of the People; 6) Strategic Planning; 7) Human Rights; 8) Informing the Public; 9) Personnel Management; 10) Cooperating with Other Parts of Government; 11) Physical Infrastructure; and 12) Budget. The AGM requires complete cooperation of the government office being assessed. It entails an in-depth assessment by personnel with specialized skills in various functions of government. Each AGM may take 0.5 to 2.0 days. The data produced will be valuable at the level of the PRT when used in a mentorship relationship with the government leader(s). When compiled across regions, the data will be useful in the assessment phase of the commander's decision cycle for operations at the operational (CJCMOTF) level. The data will also be useful for multilateral decision makers. The AGM has not yet been fully developed and will be detailed in a separate report.

4.4. National Key Program Indicators

Data on certain minimum essential functions of government identified in the CMO end state are monitored by organizations outside of the CJCMOTF, either in the form of MOE for those organizations, or as a matter of routine. National Key Program Indicators provide effectiveness data on national level programs or activities critical to CMO end state. The following is a list of these national level programs and activities, and the organizations or nations that have the lead for monitoring or implementation.

1. Security status (UNAMA; CJTF-180 CJ2)

2. Afghan National Army status (OMC-A)

3. Police status (Germany; US DoS)

4. Judicial system status (Italy)

5. Democracy (CLJ, Elections; UNAMA)

6. Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program (UNAMA; Japan)

7. Infrastructure (USAID; multiple international donors)

8. Potentially others based on the requirements of interagency partners

4.5. Tactical Level Versus Operational Level MOE

The AGQI can be viewed as tactical level MOE, while the AGM may be viewed as operational level MOE. In this theater, CJCMOTF operations occur at the operational level, while PRT operations take place at the tactical level. The terms AGQI and AGM are more descriptive and more broadly applicable in the interagency and multilateral environment. Therefore, the terms AGQI and AGM will be used throughout this report.

4.6. Flow of Information and Reports

The planned flow of information in the CMO MOE system is depicted in figure 2. Both AGQI and AGM will be conducted by civil affairs teams and interagency personnel working out of PRTs. Tactical psychological operations teams will also perform AGQI when working at PRTs. The data produced will be used directly by the PRT and also forwarded to CJCMOTF for compilation and analysis. It is expected that AGQI and possibly AGM will also be performed by UNAMA personnel who are not working out of a PRT. In that situation UNAMA will submit data directly to CJCMOTF (not depicted in the figure). National Key Program Indicators data will be reported directly by the responsible agency to CJCMOTF. The CJCMOTF will compile and analyze data and produce reports of results that will be used locally, sent to PRTs, and sent to all involved multilateral partners. In addition, periodic reports will be submitted to higher levels of command and, potentially, to Congress.

In the form presented here, the CJCMOTF acts as the central point for data compilation, analysis, and reporting for the CJOA. As command relationships, responsibilities, and mission requirements change, the system can be easily adapted. The primary modification would be to change the central point for data analysis. For example, if this function were to move to the level of CFC-CA, the principal change would be depicted in figure 2 by substituting CFC-CA for CJCMOTF. Of course, some reporting relationships would also change. It is also conceivable that at some point the primary responsibility for data analysis and reporting may move to an interagency partner such as USAID. The system has been designed to be flexible to allow changes with minimal impact on operations and reporting relationships.

4.7. Responsibilities for Specialized Functions

Some specialized functions are required within the system that are not readily available or available in sufficient quantity within the military or interagency staffs assigned to the CJOA. Functions such as data compilation, statistical analysis, and report preparation can be accomplished by contract or other personnel either in theater or, more likely, in the United States or Europe. Such a reach-back approach will be effective. This will only be possible if standardized electronic mechanisms for data reporting are in place.

Figure 2. Flow of Information in the Measures of Effectiveness System



5. Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators (AGQI)

5.1. Development

The aim was to develop a standardized AGQI data collection sheet addressing relevant subfunctions derived from the CMO end state definition. The first step was development by a small working group of an initial prototype set of MOEs. Next, the initial prototype was taken to the Bamian PRT. There it was reviewed and modified by a small working group that included the PRT Commander, US DoS representative, and experienced civil affairs team leaders, as well as a representative from CJCMOTF headquarters. The data collection sheet (version one) was used in a pilot at the Bamian PRT. Based on results of the Bamian pilot, version two of the data collection sheet was developed and sent to all PRTs for feedback. The Kandahar PRT used version two in a pilot. Version three is considered the final version (Appendix A). It takes into account all suggestions for improvement and has undergone additional working group review and review by USAID and UNAMA. The AGQI data collection sheet will be modified to meet changing mission requirements in the future as needed. It is important that major changes to the data collection sheet not be made in the course of an operation or campaign because this could greatly reduce the ability to track changes over time. Major changes are not likely to be necessary because the AGQI was designed based on a well defined end state, and a major change in the desired end state in the course of a campaign is not likely. It is anticipated that the AGQI data collection sheet will be automated and incorporated into a hand-held device to facilitate data collection and transfer.

One of the findings of the pilot studies was that the Afghanistan Information Management System (AIMS) village assessment provides little useful information and no important information that is not acquired through use of the AGQI data collection sheet. Therefore, it has been decided that the AIMS village assessment form will be used only on an as needed basis, while the AGQI data collection sheet will be completed for all interviews and meetings with local populace or leaders.

5.2. Description

The AGQI is an assessment of the quality of governance from the point of view of consumers of government. It takes the form of an interview and is primarily conducted at the level of average citizens, business people, and low-level government and traditional leaders. However, the AGQI may be used with any category of person. The design is consistent with accepted procedures for social science research of this type (Bryman, 1984; Sechrist and Sidana, 1995; Hentschel, 1998) and with interview procedures used to assess components of governance in other developing countries (World Bank International, 1999a; 1999b; 1999c). The composition of the AGQI data collection sheet takes into account previously published indicators of governance quality (Center for Democracy and Governance, 1998). The data produced can be defined primarily as quantitative in nature but the design includes information that would also allow some degree of qualitative interpretation (Bryman, 1984; Sechrist and Sidana, 1995; Hentschel, 1998). The process for collecting the data (described later) adds a significant qualitative component (Bryman, 1984; Sechrist and Sidana, 1995; Hentschel, 1998). AGQI data are of significant use in the assessment phase of the commander's decision cycle at the PRT

level and also when consolidated at higher levels. Additionally, the data are useful for multilateral decision makers. Although the AGQI was specifically designed for use in Afghanistan, it will be useful for CMO and civilian relief operations in other parts of the world, with slight modification.

5.3. Training and Personnel

Data can be collected rapidly, with each interview taking approximately 30 to 40 minutes. The skills required to perform the interviews are common to civil affairs personnel, psychological operations personnel, selected categories of civilian interagency personnel (e.g. USAID personnel), and civilian relief community personnel. A period of training and rehearsal is required for all personnel prior to performing AGQI (Appendix B). In addition to the training included in Appendix B, it is important that rehearsals and after action reviews be used by any new assessment team or whenever a new member joins a team.

Although the AGQI is not difficult to complete, the importance of employing skilled and properly trained personnel to perform the AGQI deserves emphasis. The AGQI is not analogous to "person-on-the-street" opinion polls. Properly trained and locally operating personnel should perform the AGQI. These personnel understand the potential effects of their presence on responses and can take measures to minimize those effects. They are skilled at building relationships with the populace. They understand the implications of potential responses and can lead the conversation to get more information when warranted. Locally operating personnel understand the nuances of the local culture and the local situation. The use of properly trained and locally operating personnel also makes possible the high payoff that comes with building individual and organizational relationships over time.

The importance of interpreters cannot be over-emphasized. When one considers that each question asked and each response given passes through the interpreter, the importance of the interpreter becomes clear. The interpreter is an essential part of the team. Interpreters should be treated as a true part of the team, they should train and practice as part of the team, and they should be made to feel that they are a part of the team. Interpreters must fully understand the assessment process and each question asked so that they can best relate the attitudes of the interviewees and their answers to questions. To facilitate complete understanding of each question by each interpreter, the AGQI data collection sheet should be translated into Dari and Pashto to enable each Dari or Pashto speaking interpreter to see the questions in his native language. Translations are in progress.

5.4. Format

The AGQI data collection sheet is a standardized form with some sections that are completed for all interviews and other sections that are completed only for leaders or business people (Appendix A). The data collection sheet is designed to maximize check-the-block format to minimize required writing on the part of the recorder. Most of the form is formatted for answers on a 0 to 5 scale, with 1 indicating strong disagreement, 5 indicating strong agreement, and 0 denoting a response of non-applicable or does not

know. The data collection sheet is divided into eight parts: Part 1: Demographics (15-20 questions); Part 2: Attitudes (8 questions); Part 3: Security (7 questions); Part 4: Human Rights (2 questions); Part 5: Democracy (5 questions); Part 6: Government Competency in Meeting People's Needs (11 questions); Part 7: Leaders Only (8 questions); and Part 8: Business People Only (15). Often, it is possible and advisable to complete part of the demographics section prior to the interview. In total, 48 questions are completed for an average citizen, 61 questions are completed for a leader, and 63 questions are completed for a business person.

5.5. Interview Methodology

5.5.1. Team Composition. Experience has revealed some interview techniques worth noting. Force protection must be the utmost priority and must be planned and rehearsed. The force protection element should be separate from the interview team(s) to allow interview teams to focus completely on their work. Each interview team includes an interviewer, a recorder, and an interpreter. When necessary, the interviewer can serve as the recorder but this detracts from the interviewer's ability to focus on the interview. It is important that the interviewer run the interview. Neither the interpreter nor the recorder should assume the initiative in this regard. In practice, rank and gender of the interviewer and recorder have not been issues. Well trained personnel in the rank of E-4 can successfully perform the AGQI interview, although noncommissioned officers and officers should be considered the primary interviewers. Interagency or multilateral personnel with similar levels of experience may also be considered primary interviewers.

5.5.2. Conducting the Interview. There are two basic methods to locate a person to interview. One is for the interpreter to go ahead and find someone who is willing to be interviewed. Then the full team approaches or the potential interviewee is lead to the team. The other is for the entire team to accompany the interpreter as he approaches potential interviewees. Both of these methods have applications. Before starting the interview, find a semi-private or private place to conduct the interview. The interview should be conducted with only a single interviewee or with a very small group of people with whom the interviewee is obviously comfortable. The interviewee should be in a position to be as candid as possible. If the situation does not seem right, relocate the interview or ask the extra people to leave. Be sure that such a request cannot be perceived as being initiated by the interviewee. Do not allow additional people to join the interview once it has started. The interview team must be cognizant of the potential that enemy or government informants may attempt to hear what is being said. An effective way to start the interview is for the interviewer to introduce him or herself and to explain that part of his or her job is to help the Afghan Government better serve the people. Tell the interviewee that to best help the government improve, the team (or agency, the Coalition, etc.) must know what the people really need and how the government is doing for them. Ensure the interviewee that all answers will be anonymous. Each interview should be conducted with a single interviewee. Even if more than one person is present and is participating in the conversation, answers must be assigned to a single interviewee and recorded as such. Do not conduct two interviews simultaneously within the same small group. As a minimum, this will be distracting to the interviewee. A likely problem with conducting simultaneous interviews is that

interviewees will influence each other's answers. During the course of the interview, the best technique is for the interviewer to conduct the interview in the order that the topics appear on the AGQI data collection sheet. Rehearsals should be conducted by each team to ensure that each of the three members of the team have exactly the same understanding of the meaning of each statement on the AGQI data collection sheet.

There were initial concerns about how interviewees might respond to seeing someone recording their responses and asking questions according to a form. Based on experience to date, it does not appear that the obvious use of the AGQI data collection sheet in any way detracts from the quality of the interview. In fact, it appears that the obvious use of the form reinforces to the interviewee that the interviewer considers his or her opinions important. This may differ with different populations.

When completing the data collection sheet, it is important to complete each question. However, if the interviewee does not seem to understand the question after a few attempts at rephrasing, it is best to skip the question. Do not convey frustration or disappointment to the interviewee. Remain interested and appreciative of his or her honest opinions and for taking the time to speak with you. Each question must have only one answer on the 0 to 5 scale. The interview team must make the judgment. If in doubt, make a note and then finalize the single answer as soon as possible after the interview.

5.5.3. Experience with the AGQI to Date. The following observations are based on experiences with the final version of the AGQI data collection sheet as employed by the Parwan, Jalalabad, Gardez, and Kandahar PRTs. Some interpreters have initially been skeptical about the level of honesty that interviewees would display. After participating in AGQI interviews, many of these same interpreters have been impressed with the level of honesty they perceived among the interviewees. In general, the interpreters that we have worked with in performing these interviews have expressed that the process is very valuable and important. The responses from interviewees have been positive, with interviewees frequently stating that they were glad that someone was finally asking them what they thought. After conducting 35 AGQI at the Jalalabad PRT (data to be presented elsewhere), a group of 10 civil affairs soldiers and interpreters were asked their opinions about the AGQI. The civil affairs soldiers had over five months experience on the ground in Afghanistan at the time. Responses are shown in table 4. Responses were on a 1 to 5 scale with a score of 1 meaning strongly disagree and a score 5 meaning strongly agree; in the table, 1 and 2 were grouped as disagree and 4 and 5 were grouped as agree. The responses indicate that the AGQI process was very useful for PRT operations, helped the teams learn more about the population, and was well worth the time required. There was no systematic evidence that the interviewees were either more or less honest due to the presence of Coalition troops. Anecdotally, interpreters at each location commented that people were apt to be more honest and open with Coalition military personnel than with local government officials. At all PRTs where the AGQI process has been employed, including Gardez, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Parwan, the general feeling was that the AGQI interview process, in addition to providing data for use in monitoring MOE, provides a discussion format that leads to an enhanced understanding of the population on the part of the personnel working in the area and conducting AGQI. It was

noted that with most other interactions with the populace, discussions are limited to a single topic, such as a well project, and do not include the in-depth discussions of the population's needs and attitudes that are facilitated by the AGQI.

5.6. Utility of AGQI

The AGQI may be employed according to a national strategy (see Section 6) or used in a targeted manner by PRT, other civil affairs or psychological operations elements, or by a variety of multilateral partners. The data from AGQI are useful in guiding decisions on CMO activities at unit through national levels, guiding good governance mentorship programs, and monitoring progress over time in a statistically valid manner. The AGQI is a tool that empowers civil affairs and tactical psychological operations teams, as well as interagency personnel, in better understanding the population and its needs.

Table 4. Post-AGQI Survey of 10 Experienced Civil Affairs Team-A Soldiers and Interpreters

Statement	Disagree	Neutral	Agree
Time well spent (mean=36 min)	0	0	10
AGQI is more useful than AIMS village assessment	0	1	9
AGQI helps you learn a lot about the population that you did not know	0	2	8
People are more truthful when talking with Coalition military	2	6	2
People are very willing to talk to military	1	2	7
AGQI is the single most productive PRT activity to learn about the population and its needs	0	2	8

6. National Sampling Strategy

6.1. General

A systematic means for monitoring governance quality is required so that progress in governance development can be determined over the long term. We have developed two complimentary types of assessments of governance, the AGQI and the AGM. This describes the rationale and basic approach to sampling using these two assessments.

6.2. Sampling Approach

Three distinct approaches were considered in determining the sampling strategy to be used to monitor development of good governance in Afghanistan. The first was to monitor governance in the capital city, Kabul. Benefits of this approach include: 1) simplicity, 2) relatively small resource requirements, and 3) the ability to monitor development of the central government. Limitations of this approach include: 1) lack of representation of other geographic regions, 2) lack of representation of ethnic groups in other parts of the country, and 3) the distinctly different nature of Kabul compared to the rest of the country, due to the extensive ISAF, Coalition, and other international presence.

The next potential approach considered was to monitor governance in all geographic regions of the country, for example in each district. The advantages of this approach include: 1) representation of all geographic areas, 2) representation of all ethnic groups, and 3) representation of urban areas, remote rural areas, and all gradations in between. The limitations of this approach are: 1) it is the most resource intensive approach in terms of funding, personnel, equipment, and time; 2) inability, considering realistic resource limitations, to obtain enough samples from any given area to be able to draw many important conclusions; and 3) large resource requirements would reduce time and other resources available to engage in governance mentoring relationships.

The third approach considered was the Indicator Cities approach. In this approach, selected cities would be monitored. The assumption would be made that changes in governance in these cities would be representative of Afghan governance progress overall. The advantages of this approach include: 1) ability to focus on specifically selected cities representing all regions of the country, 2) significantly reduced resource requirements compared to the second approach, 3) ability to obtain enough data from each city to allow meaningful interpretation by city and region, and 4) compatibility of the approach with governance mentoring relationships. Limitations include: 1) lack of representation of remote rural areas and 2) more resource intensive than the first approach. We selected the Indicator Cities approach.

6.3. Selection of Indicator Cities and Provinces

Twenty-one Indicator Cities were selected based on the following criteria in decreasing order of importance: 1) population, 2) transportation routes, 3) proximity to the “Ring” Road, and 4) historical importance. The provinces in which these cities are located are considered Indicator Provinces (Table 5; Figure 3). Each PRT will be assigned responsibility for Indicator Cities located within its respective PRT region. Each PRT will have one to three Indicator Cities (Table 6).

6.4. Two Types of Governance Sampling

Two types of data will be collected on a periodic basis as a means to monitor progress in the development of good governance: AGQI and AGM. The AGQI is performed by interview and involves completion of a data collection sheet by the interviewer. This is an assessment of governance quality from the point of view of the consumers of government. Assessments of Governance Quality Indicators will be performed monthly for each Indicator City (Table 7). These assessments will also be employed in a more intensive manner to rapidly develop baseline data (Table 7), for example, at the start of a formal governance mentoring relationship. In addition, AGQI will be used in a targeted manner at the discretion of PRT commanders or interagency partners. The AGQI data from Indicator Cities will be considered as representative of both the cities and the respective provinces. Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators data will be collected regardless of whether AGM data are collected for any given city.

Baseline and periodic AGQI will be performed according to the following guidelines.

1. Prior to sampling, each city will be divided into three geographic sectors.

2. Each month for the assigned Indicator Cities, 3 average citizens, 3 business people, and 3 low-level government or traditional leaders will be interviewed, with one of each category representing each city sector.

3. No individual may be interviewed more frequently than once per 3 months.

4. The two major ethnic groups (or tribal affiliations) in each respective city will be sampled equally during any 3 month period, with at least one of each of the two ethnic groups represented in each citizen category each month.

The AGM involves an in-depth review of the systems, mechanisms, and functions of government offices and organizations. It must be conducted by personnel with specialized skills. Assessments of Governance Mechanisms will be performed for both the Indicator City government and the Indicator Provincial government once every three months, for Indicator Cities and Indicator Provinces that are on a formal good governance development program (Table 7). When compiled appropriately, Indicator City and Indicator Province data will be considered as representative of governance development for respective regions and the nation as a whole.

6.5. Statistical Basis for Sampling Approach

6.5.1. Influence of Interviewer on AGQI Data. Some organizations have expressed concern that the mere presence of military personnel during the AGQI interview process will affect responses, rendering the data unreliable. While it is true that interview data may be affected by the military presence, the fact is that there is an effect of any assessor (person collecting data). There is an effect of a military presence, an effect of the presence of civilian coalition government representatives, and an effect of the presence of NGO personnel. There are also effects of subconscious assessor bias and many other factors. All data of this type are subject to assessor/interviewer effects. This does not

mean that the data are not valid and useful; it means that these factors must be understood up front. Each measurement has an unavoidable "human nature" component of variance associated with the interviewer. Recognizing this, we will employ the following methods to account for and minimize these effects. These methods include: 1) use of skilled assessors; 2) use of a standardized, easy-to-use tool; 3) use of composite indicators; 4) use of multiple assessor-types; 5) accounting for assessor effects statistically (both within and between assessor-types); and 6) use of a systematic sampling plan. There is no reason to believe that AGQI data collected by military personnel will be any less useful than interview data collected by anyone else.

6.5.2. General Approach to Statistical Analysis. Most AGQI data are based on a modified Likert scale using possible scores of 0–5 representing the degree of agreement or support for the statement or item listed in the AGQI data collection sheet. A score of 1 corresponds to "strong disagreement/opposition" and a score of 5 corresponds to "strong agreement/support." Scores of 0 correspond to "I do not know" or "Nonapplicable." For most questions, a score of 0 will be treated as no answer (missing value). In some instances, the answer "I do not know" is in itself a bad outcome (e.g. when asking if the person believes he would be treated fairly by the police if arrested). In cases where "I do not know" represents a bad outcome, a score of 2 (disagreement/opposition) will be assigned. As a result, the scale will be 1-5 for the purposes of most data analyses. Composites of multiple related variables will be formed by a process of averaging and weighting to assess selected components of governance. Although the 1-5 scale described is not a true continuous scale, the numeric value of each response is positively related to the level of agreement with the statement. For statements and questions phrased in the negative and statements for which "agree" represents a bad outcome, scores will be converted. The result will be that a score of 4 is always better than 3, 3 is better than 2, and so on. Further, mean scores will be important and meaningful during data interpretation. Composite scores will not be limited to the 1-5 discrete scale but will assume a continuous nature with possible values ranging from 1.0 and 5.0. Therefore, the initial data analysis approach will treat these data as continuous.

It will also be important to examine these data on the basis of categorizations such as "mildly to strongly disagree" and "mildly to strongly agree." For these analyses, data will be considered categorical, and nonparametric statistical methods will be employed.

6.5.3. Sample Size Estimation. Required sample size for continuous data was estimated based on pilot AGQI data. The value for the "Support for Government Institutions" composite variable for the pilot conducted at the Kandahar PRT was 3.27 ± 0.70 (mean ± standard deviation), based on 22 observations. This result was used as an estimate of expected variance in the larger sample population. Sample size calculation was made based on the following equation for estimating sample size for detecting differences between two means.

$$n = 2(s)^2(Z_{\alpha}+Z_{\beta})^2 / (MDC)^2$$

We wish to detect differences between means with α=.05 and a power of 0.80. Required sample sizes for three differences of interest are shown in table 8.

Sampling for AGQI will be in multiples of 3 to provide for a balanced design with respect to the citizen, business person, and leader categories. The national sampling strategy will allow us to detect a change of slightly less than 1.0 unit in a composite governance variable for a city between any two months, assuming variance similar to that observed in the pilot. We will be able to detect a change smaller than 0.75 units between any two quarters (n=27 for a city in a 3 month period) and a change smaller than 0.50 units between any two six month periods (n=54 for a city in a 6 month period).

Although the primary determinants of sample size estimation were the ability to detect changes for continuous variables and a balanced design, it was also important to have adequate power for categorical variables. The proposed sampling plan will allow detection of a 26% change in proportion of responses in the category "agree or strongly agree" for any given discrete governance variable, with α=.05 and a power of 0.80, when examining data for a given city for any two six month periods. A 26% change is relevant and important. This estimate assumes a starting proportion of 40% and an increase to 66%, and is based on the following equation.

$$n = (Z_{\alpha}+Z_{\beta})^2(p_1q_1+p_2q_2) / (p_2-p_1)$$

Data analysis at the national level will have a great deal more power. This sampling strategy is planned to make data useful over time at both the PRT level and at the national (CJCMOTF) level.

The AGM will be used only within the context of governance mentoring relationships and will be dependent on participation in a formal good governance development program. Therefore, sample size estimation was not performed for the AGM.

Figure 3. Afghanistan Key Indicator Cities



Table 5. List of 21 Indicator Cities and Provinces

Rank	City Name	Province Name
1	Kabul	Kabul
2	J-Bad	Nangarhar
3	Gardez	Paktia
4	Kandahar	Kandahar
5	Herat	Herat
6	MeS	Balkh
7	Konduz	Konduz
8	Bamian	Bamian
9	Ghazni	Ghazni
10	Tirin Kot	Oruzgan
11	Qalat	Zabul
12	Khost	Khowst
13	Shiberghan	Jowzjan
14	Farah	Farah
15	Baghlan	Baghlan
16	Sharan	Paktika
17	Lashkar Gah	Helmand
18	Sari Pul	Sari Pul
19	Qala-e-Naw	Badghis
20	Mihtarlam	Laghman
21	Asadabad	Konar

Table 6. PRT Responsibilities for Indicator Cities

Indicator City	PRT
Asadabad	Asadabad
Bamian	Bamian
Gardez	Gardez
Sharan	Gardez/Ghazni
Ghazni	Ghazni
Farah	Herat
Qala-e-Naw	Herat
Herat	Herat
Jalalabad	Jalalabad
Mihtarlam	Jalalabad
Kandahar	Kandahar
Tirin Kot	Kandahar
Lashkar Gah	Kandahar
Khost	Khost
Konduz	Konduz
Baghlan	Konduz
Masar-e-Sharif	Masar-e-Sharif
Shiberghan	Masar-e-Sharif
Sari Pul	Masar-e-Sharif
Kabul	Parwan
Qalat	Qalat

Table 7. Assessment Type and Frequency for Indicator Cities and Provinces

Assessment Type	Location	Subject of Assessment	Frequency	
			Baseline	Periodic
AGQI*	Indicator City	Average Citizen	9 the first month	3 per month
AGQI*	Indicator City	Business Person	9 the first month	3 per month
AGQI*	Indicator City	Leader	9 the first month	3 per month
AGM**	Indicator City	Office of Mayor	1 the first month	1 per quarter
AGM**	Indicator Province	Office of Governor	1 the first month	1 per quarter

*AGQI: Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators

**AGM: Assessment of Governance Mechanisms; only performed within the context of a formal governance promotion program

Table 8. Estimated Sample Size for Three Differences

Difference to Detect	Estimated Sample Size
0.50	31
0.75	14
1.00	8

7. Conclusion

A system of metrics was needed to assess progress in achieving desired tactical and operational effects toward a defined CMO end state in Afghanistan. Such a system would be of value within the CJCMOTF and also have potential to become an integral part of an overarching system of metrics to monitor overall progress in Afghanistan and in the Global War of Terrorism. To meet this need, a MOE system for CJCMOTF CMO in Afghanistan was developed.

There are two general types of metrics that may be employed, MOE and MOP; these are often confused. Measures of effectiveness may be contrasted with MOP. While MOP monitor whether or not tasks are performed, MOE provide information on whether or not performance of tasks yields the desired effects. Properly designed and implemented MOE provide critical information on whether and to what degree operations have the intended effects. Assessment of effects is an integral part of the commander's (or other decision maker's) decision cycle, and has application in both military and civilian-lead operations.

To most effectively develop MOE, a systematic and prospective approach must be used. It is possible, and perhaps sometimes necessary, to select MOE as tasks are defined during the course of a long-term operation. However, this reactive method of MOE identification has important drawbacks and should be avoided when possible. A specific sequence of steps should be followed in developing MOE, and the MOE thus developed should possess specific characteristics. In practice it may be necessary to use an abbreviated approach to MOE development, due to constraints of time or other factors. However, omission of any step in the defined process should be based on a conscious decision. The two major components to the process are: 1) End state definition and identification of potential effects and 2) MOE selection and refinement. It is extremely important to adequately define the end state at the outset and to base MOE development on the defined end state. While mission requirements or the general approach to operations (e.g. lines of operation) may change, the desired end state is not likely to change much if at all during a campaign. When MOE are based on the end state, as opposed to a given approach (e.g. lines of operation), the MOE system will be able to adapt to changes with minimal impact, and will be more focused. Although the specific application of the MOE development process presented here was for CMO, the MOE development process described can be applied to any type of operation.

The CMO end state was defined with the active participation of multiple partners using a multilateral approach, and with thorough consideration given the previously defined end states of relevant stakeholders. This multilateral approach to end state definition and to MOE development as a whole proved extremely valuable and productive, and should be used whenever possible. The MOE system reported here has the flexibility to adapt to changes in command relationships and reporting structures. Because it is based on a well-defined end state, the system is robust enough to remain effective with minimal adjustment through changes in situation, mission, lines of operation, participating agencies, and other factors.

A significant component of the MOE system described is the AGQI data collection sheet. The AGQI is an assessment of the quality of governance from the point of view of consumers of government. It takes the form of an interview and is primarily conducted at the level of average citizens, business people, and low level government and traditional leaders. However, the AGQI may be used with any category of person. The AGQI may be employed according to a national strategy or used in a targeted manner by PRT, other civil affairs or psychological operations elements, or by a variety of multilateral partners. The data from AGQI are useful in guiding decisions on CMO activities at unit through national levels, guiding good governance mentorship programs, and monitoring progress over time in a statistically valid manner. The AGQI is a tool that empowers civil affairs and tactical psychological operations teams, as well as interagency personnel, in better understanding the population and its needs. Although the AGQI was specifically designed for use in Afghanistan, it will be useful for CMO and civilian relief operations in other parts of the world, with slight modification.

One of the findings of the pilot studies using the AGQI was that the Afghanistan Information Management System (AIMS) village assessment provides little important information that is not acquired through use of the AGQI data collection sheet. Therefore, it was decided that the AIMS village assessment form will be used only on an as needed basis by CJCMOTF, while the AGQI data collection sheet will be completed for all interviews and meetings with local populace or leaders. This finding raises the larger issue of the need for robust assessment tools for civil affairs and psychological operations personnel to assess populations and their needs across a wide range of operations and environments. The AGQI has great potential for use as a standard assessment method to augment Tactics Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) already in use by Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Forces.

Development of a MOE system and of specific methods or tools to gather MOE data are not in and of themselves sufficient. A comprehensive sampling strategy must guide data collection. The strategy selected must consider factors such as resources available, cost, representation of the populace, and other factors, as well as statistical validity. Once a strategy is selected it must be followed over time to obtain optimal results.

The approach to MOE development presented here can be applied generally to MOE development for a variety of different types of operations. The specific system developed to monitor MOE for CMO in Afghanistan has the potential to provide statistically valid and useful information and provides a system of metrics to monitor good governance development and other progress toward the CMO end state in Afghanistan.

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Appendix A. Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators Data Collection Sheet

1. Date:	**2. Recorder:**	**3. CAT-A:**
4. PRT: ☐ Bamian(1) ☐ Gardez(2) ☐ Ghazni(3) ☐ Herat(4) ☐ Jalalabad(5) ☐ Kandahar(6) ☐ Konduz(7) ☐ MeS(8) ☐ Parwan(9) ☐ Other(10):_____		
5. Village:	**6. Village Location (grid (*preferred*) or Lat-Long):**	
7. District:	**8. Province:**	
9. Population (list family information or total population): **a. Number Families:_____ b. Family Size:_____ c. Total Population:_____**		
10. Ethnic Group of Person Interviewed: ☐ Aimak(1) ☐ Baloch(2) ☐ Brahui(3) ☐ Hazara(4) ☐ Kirghiz(5) ☐ Kuchie(6) ☐ Nuristani(7) ☐ Pashtun(8) ☐ Qizilibash(9) ☐ Tajik(10) ☐ Turkman(11) ☐ Uzbeck(12) ☐ Other(13):_____		
11. Gender of person interviewed: ☐ Male(1) ☐ Female(2)		
12. Is person interviewed a business owner/management representative?: ☐ No(1) ☐ Yes(2)		
13. Is person interviewed a member of the media?: ☐ No(1) ☐ Yes(2)		
14. Is person interviewed employed by the government?: ☐ No(1) ☐ Yes(2)		
15. Is person interviewed a leader/leader's representative?: ☐ No(1) ☐ Yes(2) (Includes elected and appointed delegate/representative of the people)		

Government Employee Only (i.e. answered #14 Yes)

16. Occupation in Service of Government: ☐ Education(1) ☐ Elected/appointed delegate/representative of the people(2) ☐ Health Care(3) ☐ Individual Contract Service(4) ☐ Judicial (Court System)(5) ☐ Military(6) ☐ Police(7) ☐ Revenue (accepts money (e.g. taxes, fees, etc.) on behalf of government)(8) ☐ Other civil service(9)

Leader/Leader Representative Only (i.e. answered #15 Yes)

17. Level of Leadership Position: ☐ Local/Village/City(1) ☐ District(2) ☐ Province(3) ☐ National(4) ☐ Military(5)
18. Type of Leader: ☐Civil(1) ☐ Education(2) ☐ Elected/appointed delegate/representative of the people(3) ☐ Judicial (Court System)(4) ☐ Military ANA(5) ☐ Military Not ANA(6) ☐ Ministerial Representative(7) ☐ Police(8) ☐ Religious(9) ☐ Traditional(10) ☐ Other(11): _____
19. Position of Leader (Mark all that apply): ☐ District (Sub)governor(1) ☐ Judge(2) ☐ Mayor(3) ☐ Military Commander(4) ☐ Mullah(5) ☐Police Chief/Commander(6) ☐ School Principal(7) ☐ Shura Leader(8) ☐ Village Elder(9) ☐ Other(10):_____
20. Name of Leader/Leader Representative (Optional):

Attitudes

Rate the person's attitude toward the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Strongly Positive
21. ITGA (Central Government)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
22. ANA	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
23. Local Government (for leader read as "next higher government")	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
24. Local Police	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
25. Presence of Coalition Troops	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
26. Relief Community	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
27. Other ethnic groups in area	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

----------Format Change----------

28. Person believes that civilian relief community and military are separate — Does not know (0) ☐ No (1) ☐ Yes (5) ☐

Security

Categorize the person's level of agreement (actual or estimated) with the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
29. ITGA is responsible for security efforts in area	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
30. The security situation is good; there are no security concerns	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
31. The security situation will worsen if Coalition troops leave the area	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
32. The Afghan people will benefit if the government disarms the militia forces	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
33. The government's disarmament process will succeed	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
34. If person is a victim of a crime, the police will help	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

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35. There is a police station within a half day's travel (by normal means) Does not know (0) ☐ No (1) ☐ Yes (5) ☐

Human Rights

Categorize the person's level of agreement (actual or estimated) with the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
36. Person feels he could file a human rights complaint without fear of reprisal	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

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37. Are there human rights concerns (government mistreats populace) in this area? Does not know (0) ☐ No (1) ☐ Yes (5) ☐

Democracy

Categorize the person's level of agreement (actual or estimated) with the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
38. CLJ delegates are representative of the people	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
39. CLJ elections will be conducted impartially and without reprisals	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
40. The CLJ process is legitimate	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
41. National election authority will be impartial	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
42. Person believes he can vote freely and without reprisal	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

Government Competency in Meeting People's Needs

43. ITGA is responsible for relief efforts in area	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
44. Government is addressing citizens' needs	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
45. Person believes that he has adequate information about key aspects of government activity	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
46. Corruption is a serious problem in government	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
47. People are free to say and write what they think about the government	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
48. Person believes he will be treated fairly if arrested or if he files a complaint with the police	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

Government Competency in Meeting People's Needs (Continued)

Categorize the person's level of agreement (actual or estimated) with the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
49. To get government services it helps to pay the government official a personal fee (bribe)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
50. Person is confident that his economic situation will improve (including food and shelter if applicable)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

----------Format Change----------

51. Education available and accessible

(0) ☐ None (1) ☐ Informal only (homes/mosques)

(2) ☐ For boys only (3) ☐ For boys and girls

Top Three Needs

52. Top 3 needs as stated by the person:	**53. Top 3 needs as judged by the recorder:**
1 ☐ Agricultural supplies	1 ☐ Agricultural supplies
2 ☐ Electricity	2 ☐ Electricity
3 ☐ Employment opportunities	3 ☐ Employment opportunities
4 ☐ Equipment/facilities for government	4 ☐ Equipment/facilities for government
5 ☐ Food	5 ☐ Food
6 ☐ Infrastructure repairs not addressed in other categories	6 ☐ Infrastructure repairs not addressed in other categories
7 ☐ Irrigation	7 ☐ Irrigation
8 ☐ Medical facilities	8 ☐ Medical facilities
9 ☐ Medical personnel	9 ☐ Medical personnel
10 ☐ Pay for government employees	10 ☐ Pay for government employees
11 ☐ Police	11 ☐ Police
12 ☐ Road/bridge	12 ☐ Road/bridge
13 ☐ Schools	13 ☐ Schools
14 ☐ Security presence	14 ☐ Security presence
15 ☐ Teachers	15 ☐ Teachers
16 ☐ Veterinary care	16 ☐ Veterinary care
17 ☐ Water (clean water to drink)	17 ☐ Water (clean water to drink)
18 ☐ Other:	18 ☐ Other:

If person is a leader, go to question 54.
If person is a business person, go to question 62.

Leader Only

Categorize the person's level of agreement (actual or estimated) with the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
54. Government has adequate offices, equipment and supplies (refers to the person's level of government)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
55. Taxes are collected at this level of government	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
56. Taxes are submitted to higher government	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
57. To get government services for his village or office it helps to pay the higher level official a personal fee (bribe)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
58. Some higher level officials will enact regulations that favor those willing to pay (bribe)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
59. Government employees are paid regularly	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

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60. Direction of government communications (last 30 days) (0) ☐ None (1) ☐ From higher only (2) ☐ To higher only (3) ☐ Two-way

61. There is a central government (ITGA) representative present at this level of government Does not know (0) ☐ No (1) ☐ Yes (5) ☐

Business Owner or Management Representative Only

62. Number of employees:_____

63. Type of business:

☐ Agriculture(1) ☐ Banking/Finance(2) ☐ Commerce (retail or wholesale)(3)
☐ Construction(4) ☐ Food processing(5) ☐ Manufacturing(6) ☐ Mining/Natural Resources(7)
☐ Professional (e.g. physician, lawyer, etc.)(8) ☐ Service(9)
☐ Transportation, distribution, storage (e.g. trucking, etc.)(10)

☐ Other(11):_____

Categorize the person's level of agreement (actual or estimated) with the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
64. It is easy to get information about government policies and procedures	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
65. Laws, regulations, and fees are a problem for person's business	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
66. Government protects property rights	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
67. It is safe to use the banking system for financial assets	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
68. To get government licenses or services for business it helps to make some "unofficial payments" (bribes)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
69. Some higher level officials will enact regulations that favor those who make "unofficial payments" (bribes)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
70. Business is better this year than last year	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
71. Person expects to be in business 3 years from now	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

Business Owner or Management Representative Only (Continued)

Categorize the person's level of agreement (actual or estimated) with the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
72. Person has hired or will hire employees this year	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
73. The road infrastructure is a problem for the person's business	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
74. Unofficial road use tolls are a problem for the person's business	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
75. Local warlords are a problem for the person's business	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
76. Crime is a problem for the person's business	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

Comments

Appendix B. Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators Assessor Training

Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators (AGQI): Assessor Training

March 2004

Purpose



- This training program is designed to train personnel who will perform AGQI

Training Components



- Overview briefing on MOE development
- Orientation to the Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators data collection sheet
- Small group practical exercise
- Total training time: approximately 2 hours

Expectations After Training



- Task: Perform assessments of governance quality indicators
- Conditions: During CMO throughout Afghanistan as directed by command
- Standard: Assessments are properly completed and data forwarded to CJCMOTF within established timelines

CJCMOTF AGQI Assessor Training Part 1: Overview Briefing



CJCMOTF Measures of Effectiveness for CMO: Metrics to Evaluate Good Governance Development

Purpose



- Provide an overview of the CJCMOTF program to develop metrics of (good) governance development

Outline

- Perspective on PRT Operations
- Measures of Effectiveness: The Need
- Program Description
  - CMO Endstate Definition
  - Overall MOE Program
  - Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators (Tactical Level MOE)
- Summary and Conclusion



Perspective on PRT Operations

PRT Concept

- PRT concept has evolved
  - Most PRTs newly established but concept maturing
- PRT is an Interagency Entity
  - Interagency Personnel (Greater Civilian Presence)
  - Interagency Mission, Operations, Funding
  - Expert mentoring capability
  - Includes ITGA
  - Collaboration with UN
- No longer a purely military operation
- Military component enables other components

Current and Future PRT Roles (1 of 2)

- Relationships/Influence
  - Platform for promotion of local and regional (good) governance development
  - Specialized functions based on local need and PRT personnel (Ag, Ed, etc.)
  - Mitigate Green-on-Green
- Security Presence and Advisory Role

Current and Future PRT Roles (2 of 2)

- Government of Afghanistan Liaison
- Project Management
- Emergency communications hub
- MEDEVAC site/MEDEVAC coordination
- Liaison with Combat Forces
- Limited Humanitarian Assistance

Measures of Effectiveness Development

Assessment of Effectiveness Important in All Systems







Industrial and medical quality improvement programs



- The question is not ***IF*** we should assess our effectiveness, it is a question of ***HOW*** we should assess our effectiveness

The Need



- Systematic means to assess progress in achieving effects toward a defined endstate
- Commonly measure tasks performed
  - schools repaired, meetings held, wells drilled
- Possible to perform a task but not attain the desired effects
- Measure of Performance: Tasks Performed
- Measure of Effectiveness: Effects Achieved

Measures of Effectiveness Versus Performance (1 of 2)

- A primary desired effect of our operations is development of good governance
- Task toward achieving effect: Conduct meetings as part of a mentoring program
- Measure of Performance (MOP) provides information whether tasks are completed
- MOP: Number of meetings conducted

...but did governance improve?

Measures of Effectiveness Versus Performance (2 of 2)



- Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) provides information on whether our operations are resulting in the ***desired effects*** on the path to our endstate
- **MOE:** Indicators that provide information on changes in status of key functions of government

MOE Development Program

- Program to develop MOE was initiated in mid-July 2003.
- Four major components
  - 1) Civil-Military (C-M) Endstate Definition
  - 2) Develop Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators (AGQI; Tactical Level MOE)
  - 3) Develop Assessment of Governance Mechanisms (Operational Level MOE)
  - 4) Identify National Key Program Indicators

Civil-Military (C-M) Endstate Definition

Milestones, Missions, and Endstates of Various Organizations Fall Along a Continuum Leading to the GoA Endstate

C-M Endstate

- The set of Afghan government capabilities and conditions that must exist such that:
  - major coalition combat forces can depart
  - the Afghan government will continue to progress, with only NGOs, civilian coalition government reps, and international aid
- Is a ***required interim state*** on the pathway to the final Afghan endstate as described by the Government of Afghanistan

Refined C-M Endstate Definition

- A Legitimate Afghan Government that demonstrates 1) Competency; 2) Influence; 3) Democracy that is Sustainable, Participatory, and Rights-respecting, and 4) Core Deliverables in the Areas of Security, Justice, Education, and Mechanisms for Economic Development.

Governance



- Competency, Influence, Democracy comprise the basics of good governance
- Governance: Exercise of authority through formal and informal traditions and institutions for the common good.

(Good) Governance (1 of 2)

- Process of selecting, monitoring and replacing governments
  - Voice and external accountability
  - Political stability and lack of violence, crime, and terrorism
- Capacity to formulate and implement sound policies and deliver public services
  - Government effectiveness
  - Lack of regulatory burden

(Good) Governance (2 of 2)



- Respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them
  - Rule of law
  - Control of corruption

Importance of Good Governance

- Opportunities for corruption enormous in developing countries
- Good governance promotes economic development (national wealth) but not vice-versa
- Good governance will be the underpinning of the development of a legitimate Afghan government

Overall MOE Program

Governance Quality Indicators

- Tactical Level MOEs (Assessments of Governance Quality Indicators; AGQI):
  - Assessment at the level of "consumers" of government (citizens, business, low level government)
  - Of significant use in assessment phase of commander's decision cycle at the PRT level
  - Useful for multilateral decision makers
  - Also valuable when consolidated at higher levels
  - Can be collected rapidly
  - Require skills common to CA personnel, civilian interagency personnel, and relief community partners

Governance Mechanisms

- Assessments of Governance Mechanisms (Operational Level MOEs):
  - Assessment at city/district to ministerial levels
  - Primarily useful in the assessment phase of the commander's decision cycle for operations at the operational (CJCMOTF) level
  - Useful for multilateral decision makers
  - Generally more complex than tactical level measures
  - Require in-depth assessment by personnel with specialized skills in various functions of government
  - Valuable tool in local and regional governance mentoring

National Key Program Indicators

- Data on status of national level programs or activities critical to C-M endstate
  - Security status (UNAMA, CJ2)
  - ANA status (OMC-A)
  - Police status (Germany and US DoS)
  - Judicial system status (Italy)
  - Democracy (CLJ, Elections; UNAMA)
  - DDR (UNAMA; Japan)
  - Infrastructure (USAID; multiple international donors)
  - Other based on interagency partner requirements

CJCMOTF

Afghanistan



CJ5 (Plans)/POC MAJ Pusateri


Specifics of MOE Development

Tactical Level MOE Development (1 of 3)



- Development of a standardized data collection sheet that includes Tactical Level MOEs addressing subfunctions identified in the CMO endstate definition
- Useable at the CAT-A level
- Data useful at both the PRT and CJCMOTF levels (and to other organizations)

Tactical Level MOE Development (2 of 3)



- Small working group developed initial prototype set of MOEs
- Prototype reviewed and modified by a small group of Bamian PRT members, including the Commander, DoS rep, and experienced CAT-A leaders
- Version 1 data collection sheet was used in a pilot at the Bamian PRT

Tactical Level MOE Development (3 of 3)

- Based on results of the Bamian pilot, version 2 of the data collection sheet was developed and sent to all PRTs for feedback
- Version 2 data collection sheet was used in a pilot at the Kandahar PRT
- Current version incorporates feedback and has undergone additional working group and interagency review

Sampling Considerations (1 of 2)

- Effect of *ANY* assessor (person collecting data)
  - Effect of military presence on responses
  - Effect of presence of civilian coalition government rep on responses
  - Effect of NGO presence on response
  - Subconscious assessor bias
  - etc.

Sampling Considerations (2 of 2)

- All data of this type are subject to assessor/interviewer effects
- Must understand up front
  - Each measurement has a "human nature" component of variance associated with the interviewer-absolutely unavoidable
- Methods to minimize and account for effect:
  - Use of skilled assessors
  - Standardized, easy to use tool
  - Use of composite indicators
  - Use multiple assessor-types and balance
  - Systematic sampling plan

Importance of Skilled Assessors

- Tactical MOE is not analogous to "person-on-the-street" opinion polls
- Need trained and locally operating personnel
  - Understand effects of their presence
  - Skilled at building relationships with populace
  - Understand implications of answers and can lead the conversation
  - Understand local culture, nuances, and situation
  - High payoff as individual and organizational relationships are built with populace over time

Role of Interpreters



- Interpreter is an essential part of the team
- Must work and practice as part of the team
- Must understand this assessment process to best relate attitudes and answers to questions

Employment of Assessments of Governance Quality Indicators (TAC MOE)

- As required by CJCMOTF national sampling strategy
  - Specified balance of average citizens, business people, and leaders
- As a tool for PRT operations
  - Assess status of an area
  - Pre and post assessment of selected cities in a mentoring relationship
  - Targeted assessments based on mission

Standard Village Assessments



- Pilot revealed that village assessments provide little useful information and no important information that is not acquired through use of the MOE data collection sheet
- AIMS village assessment form will be used only on an as needed basis

Data Reporting



- Immediate (within 48 hours of end of mission)
  - Electronic: embedded in SITREP or as an email attachment (req TBD)
- Follow-up: Turn-in original sheets for archiving (as possible at least monthly)
- Transitioning to Access-can transmit as Excel file (attempt to put in GIS)

Summary and Conclusion

- PRT is an interagency entity with an interagency mission
- Major focus of PRT operations is local and regional (good) governance
- Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators (TAC MOE) will enable assessment of progress in achieving effects toward both the (interim) CMO endstate and the ultimate Afghan endstate
- Data collection is a team effort involving trained CA soldiers, Interagency Partners, and Interpreters
- Data will be useful at PRT, CJCMOTF, CJTF180, CFC, and higher levels


Questions or Comments

Orientation to AGQI Data Collection Sheet

Data Collection Sheet (1 of 2)

- Standardized form with sections that will be:
  - completed for all interviews
  - completed only for leaders or business people
- Designed to maximize "check the block"
- Eight Parts
  - Part 1: Demographics (15-20 questions)
  - Part 2: Attitudes (8 questions)
  - Part 3: Security (7 questions)
  - Part 4: Human Rights (2 questions)

Data Collection Sheet (2 of 2)



- Part 5: Democracy (5 questions)
- Part 6: Government Competency in Meeting People's Needs (11 questions)
- Part 7: Leaders Only (8 questions)
- Part 8: Business People Only (15)

- Average citizen: 48 questions
- Leader: 61 questions
- Business person: 63 questions

Guidelines (1 of 2)



- Fill out demographics before the interview/meeting if possible
- Work and practice as a team:
  - Leader
  - Recorder
  - Interpreter
- Provide translated forms for interpreter/leader reference
- Complete the form as you go-too long for memory

Guidelines (2 of 2)



- Discuss methods used by others-learn and share information
- Forward data to CJCMOTF
  - electronically in the SITREP within 48 hours of mission completion (attachment or embedded)
  - original data collection sheets for archive within 30 days

Report in SITREP

MOE Data Follows

1. 20031104

2. Jones

3. 13

4. 6

6. XXX XX XXXX XXXX

11. M

16. (leave blank if not used)

43. 2

etc.




Practical Exercise

Practical Exercise



- In small groups work as teams
- Alternate as role player citizen, business person, or leader
- When possible, use interpreters as role players and conduct interview in Dari or Pashto
- Use other languages where possible to perform interview in other than English
- Alternate positions on team
- Discuss and share methods/approaches

Training Summary



- Understand:
  - why we monitor MOE
  - how the Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators relates to MOE
  - importance of good governance in achieving the CMO endstate
- Be able to:
  - conduct an assessment interview
  - properly complete data collection sheet
  - properly forward data


Comments and Questions